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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CCHTIS I. GORD,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

VS.

s,\ LT LAKE CITY, a municipal

10857

corporation, et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff upon his
Yerified petition for a 'V rit of Mandamus compelling
defendants to reinstate plaintiff in his employment at
the Salt Lake City cemetery. An Order granting an
Alternatiw 'Vrit of Mandamus was issued out of the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, at the initiation of the action on February 3,
1

1967. A hearing was held on Feb
.
ruary 9 19r~
wh1ch the Honorable Stewart 'I H
' · >•. "
<
l.l •
anson J
ruled that a Peremptory 'Vrit of M· d
' · ud~r
.
an ate to co1
d ef endants to remstate
plaintiff as a ·t
llJil.
•
< '
< ci Y emplowe 1
issued and made permanent The c1·t
· ·
•
.
, .
• .
Y appeared .
this hearmg, filmg no pleadm()'s nor r d ·
·
'd
o
p o ucing Ui'•
ev1 ence to contravene Respondent's petif
"'
"
ion. 0 n th
21st <l_ay of F ebr~ary, 1967, defendant's motion ir"
rehearmg was demed but an Order holdin th :
.
g e rutk
ment m abeyance was issued by Judge Hanson in ·far;r
of defendants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court~
decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent objects to the recitation of certain facts
set forth in Appellant's Brief at Pages 2 and 3, sinct ·
all matters re lating to the reason for his discharge are
outside this record, excepting his salaried employmen:
at the Salt Lake City Cemetery. No record was mad"
of the incident concerning Respondent's discharge, nor
is it available for review. Only the fact that the Appeal
Board voted to recommend Respondent's reinstatement
with a penalty of fourteen days lost pay, in lieu of
discharge, is of record. (Plaintiff's Exh. 2 and 3).
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STATE)IE:N"T OF ISSUES
T1ic -;tatement of issues as set forth in Appellant's
ilril'I' is adequate except that additional Legislative
, j.,t:1:·.\· .~liou ld he cited.
1
The Legislature in 19.J..5 enacted a statute proYidii:.;

i'or retirement of appointed officers and employees

:h(' cities of the first class with pensions and retirell'.l 1ti lwnelits, and provided, among other things, that:

,,i

.. Should the services of any appointed off ice rs
ur employees be terminated by discharge or res-

ignation, such officer or employee shall be refunded not less than all monies withheld from
Iii~ salary or wages; and should such officer or
employee thereafter be re-employed by the city,
he shall repay to the city the amount refunded
to him and restored to the position in the pensionretiremen system which he held at the time of
his discharge or resignation." (Laws of Utah,
194<5, Chapter 24<).
It is important to point out that 49-2-5, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, came into law as
a proyiso to protect the pension-retirement program of
.ippointed officers and employees of all major municipalities. The law also stems from a grant of power
contained in 10-6-90, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended. authorizing the :Mayor, as the chief executive
otfirer, to employ qualified individuals, fix their salaries
withi11 the schedule adopted by ordinance, subject, howeYer, to 49-2-5.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IX "
INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 49-2-S, ~fT~h
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, IN THAT TOGir~I
TO THE APPEAL BOARD THE FINAL DF,
CISION DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. YI , ' .
2
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
'
Appellant complains that the Appeal Board ,,
weighted with a majority of members selected bv l'it'
employees and thus runs contra to Constitutional, mai'.
date Art. VI, § 29. Under the 1947 Act, an oppositi
majority held forth. Appellant's argument is unte1
able.

In Logan City, State Water Pollution Contru!
and Backman, cited by Appellant, municipal functiom

and prerogatives were involved. But the term "municipal function" was never intended to apply to the casf
at issue. The discharge, transfer or termination of a
city employee involves only ministerial or administrative functions. The Constitution principle cited by Ap·
pellant has not been construed as to deprive a municipal
council of the power of delegating such functions to
subordinate boards or officials. 37 Am. Jur. p. 733.

The fact that the city has the power to hire does
not mean that it has the power to fire in every case.
or that it is required to so act. Here the State Legisla·
ture has expressly authorized the delegation of powers

4

hear d1~charge cases by cities to appeals boards. The
is general law, and
01 . 1itcctio11 gi\·en such employees
;. :pplies to :dl these city employees. It is not a grant
:u :i ~pel'.lal commission or private corporation for profit,
t · lcn taxes. or to impede the city's municipal function .
k

.\ppl'lla11t's interpretation is too narrow and re-.rrictin, to meet the problems of modern city manageint n t. f< 1r not eyen the strongest form of .Mayoralty
_;ii\ enum·ut eould begiu to cope with the personnel
pruiJlems which arise daily. Salt Lake City's own Ordi;lilllt'es rccogniz;e the aclYantages of such Boards and
h:i 1 P adopted reasonable rules of procedure to insure
<l11e proeess of law. (See Ordinances printed in Appendix )
The public purpose intended to be protected by the
l' tah Constitution, Art. YI § 29, has no relationship
to the instant case.

POINT II.
TO PROPERLY PERFORM ITS MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS, THE SALT LAKE CITY
COl\IMISSION HAS PROPERLY DELEGATED THE PO,VER TO HEAR DISCHARGE
CASES OF APPOINTED OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES.
The final decision as to employees' discharge is
currectly left with the Appeal Board, where it should
be, for the protection of the aggrieved employee.
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It should be noted that the original funct'
10n tJf t1
Appeal Board, pursuant to the 1947 law, wast "
0
•
•
·
mvestigat10ns,
take and receive evidence bearin lllakt
. .
g up11,
. h
th e cause f or sueh d isc
arge, dismissal or transfe ~ •
.
r, uUri
ma k e fi n d mgs and recommendations in regard th .
.
b
ertt1
to the governmg ody of said city." (Laws of Ct,
1947, Chapter 19, Section 5.) Thus, the original t' "I.
•
LmL·
tion of the Appeal Board according to the 1947 Act
1ra1
merely to recommend action to the City Corn"';s ·
...,.u Slur.
In 1955, Senate Rill No. 57 was introduced to ain ,
e11il
49-2-5. The title of that bill is extremely helpful l'.
interpreting the purpose of the amendment. The titJi
reads:
1

"An act to amend Sec. 49-2-5, Utah Codr
Annotated 1953, providing for tenure of 1Ji.
fice and covering discharge or transfer of an.
pointive officers and employees of cities oth~r
than members of the police, fire or health de.
parments; providing for an appeal from d~.
charge or transfer; creating a Board of Appeal
with power to fully hear the matter and give
a decision." (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that the title provides that a
Board of Appeal shall have the power to "fully hear
the matter and give a decision." One amendment which
this provision made to the previous law appears in Sec.
49-2-5. The third paragraph of Sec. 49-2-5 provides
a right to counsel, a public hearing to confront the
witnesses whose testimony is to be considered, and tr
examine the evidence to be considered by the Appeal
Board.
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The second paragraph of Sec. 49-2-5 added a pro11.,ion to the 1947 law providing that ''the Appeal
jjpanl shall forthwith commence its investigation, take
:inil recei\'e evidence and fully hear and determine the
111 ,un· u·hil'h relates to the cause for such discharge 0 ,.
1 ,1 1,1/cr.'' (Emphasis supplied.) Such language supp;1rts the position that the Appeal Board was no longer
:i: mrestigative or recommending body, but rather,
'.' :t' to h:n e full power to decide the issue.
1

Finally, it seems obvious that since the decision
, t tlie Appeal Board, as provided in the fifth para~Ta ph of Sec. 49-2-5, is to be forwarded to the employee
L1· the City Recorder, and he may immediately resume
»mployment the next day after receipt of notice of
reinstatement, that the case of discharge is to be determined by the Appeal Board.
It is obvious that nothing in the present law allows
the employer to perfect an appeal from an adverse
determination of the Board and it seems difficult to
understand why an employee would want to appeal
a favorable determination.

There are certain ambiguities in the law, but it is
dear that the Legislature really did not intend to give
the governing power to over-turn reinstatements orJered by its own Appeal Board.
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN !Ts
TERPRETATION OF SECTION 49-2-~a. l:'l'J\\],
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AND PROPEilI:
ISSUED THE WRIT OF MANDATE.
,
The same legislative history cited by \p ..
r pe 1la1·
supports Respondent's case and the trial court's l
ru

!Ii~

Deletion of the words "and shall be final" frn·
the first proposed Bill in 1955 and deletion of the 1ro;·
"final" from "final decision" in the title of the Ai:does not negate the Legislature's clear intention 1,
"Create a Board of Appeals with power to fully hear
the matter and give a decision." Since ultimate discharat
had to be by concurrence of a majority of the cih
governing body, it is obvious that an unfavorable deci·
sion to the employee was not intended to be final anf. '
the employee was entitled to perfect his further appeal
to the city governing body; otherwise, the concurrence
of at least "a majority of the membership of the gm.
erning body of said city" is a meaningless mandate. ,
If on the other hand, the Appeal Board did not uphold
the discharge, then the employee prevailed, and !ht
case was over. Why must the employee be required
to perfect a further appeal from a determination 111
his favor? Such being the result, then the Board's
decision was final.
~

The trial court concluded:

8

· lt has the rluty to interpret Sec. 49-2-5 in
order to give effect to the Legislautre's int~nt.
To gin' said statute the construction which defendant contends would lead to an absurd and
tutile result and be plainly at variance with
the policy of the statute. Two provisions of said
statute bear upon each other and are incon.;iste11t with the policy of the statute as a whole.
l 11less these pnffisions are explained and
nlliditicd, the plain purpose of the statute is
de:-;troycd and an absurd injustice results." (R.
T

:,!:),

:L4).

In this ruling the Court followed well-settled Ctah
C!ISt'

law:

In Masich V, U.S. Srnelting, Refining and Mining
Co .. ( 194<8) 113 Utah 101, 191 P 2d 612, at 616, this
Court said:

"One of the cardinal principles of statutory
construction is that the Courts will look to the
reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation as
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject."
In TVashinyton County v. State Tax Comm., (1943)
103 Utah 73, 133 P 2d 564, this Court said:

'·But a statute is passed as a whole, not in
parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each
part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section, so as to
produce a harmonious whole."
In Taft 1'. Glade (1948) 114 Utah 435, 201 P 2d
28.i, this court said:
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"It is our duty interpreting a st t t
effect to legislative intent as expra u de to g11.
esse b.
.
wor d mg of the statute. If reasonab]
~.th
effec~ should be given to every part 0 [ apossililt ·
and if the enactment is subJ. ect to
statut.
i t
.
b
one
or
.,n erpretat10ns y reason of confl' t' murr
..
h
JC 1ng I
V1Slo!1s, t en ~hat construction which will b'.'•·
momze and give effect to all provisio · ar
f erred."
ns is pr

And in Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, In.
( 1967) .... Utah .... , 426 P 2d 223 this Court rec ,
'd
'
en,J\
Sal :
"Where t~er~ i~ such conflict in the provisl(,,,
of stah~tes it. 1s 1mpro~~r to place all of t!i
emphasis on either prov1s1on to the exclusion,,.
the ?t~er. They should. be considered togelhtr
and it is proper to examme into the background
and purpose as well as to the language of the
statute to discover what the legislative intent wa)
as to which should have priority."
Had the Legislature intended to provide an appeal
for the city, against an adverse decision of the Appeal
Board, it would have been simple and easy for the Legislature to have so stated. Sec. 49-2-4 Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides : " . . . employees shall hold theii
employment without limitation of time, being subject
to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided
(in 49-2-5) ."
Thus the scheme of this tenure for permanent citi'
employees with vested pension rights becomes clear
They can only be discharged by a final concurrence oi
a majority of the membership of the governing body

JO

pf tlie city; but if in the meantime they lmve won before
llil' _\ ppeal Board tbe issue is ended and there is naught
\, 1 µ:o hefort' the gow·rning body. Having reversed the
di~charge order the City Recorder certifies the decision
hi thl' employee affected and he goes back on the pay:·(\lL pr<l\·i<led he <;hows up for work the next day, which
]{e~ponrleut did.

J 11<lgc Hanson therefore correctly concluded:
''it is clear to this Court that the Legislature
meant ·In the event the Appeals Hoard shall
11ol uphold such discharge or transfer, the case
shall be closed and no further proceedings shall
be had. In the event the Appeal Board does
uphold such discharge or transfer, then such
officer or employee may have 15 days thereafter
to appeal to said governing board whose decision shall be final.' The Court has not re-written
this statute, it has merely placed the word "not"
where it properly belongs in the two sentences,
removing it out of the second and placing it into
the first." ( R. 24) .

This common sense interpretation comports with
due process of law, good _procedure, and making the·
entire statute a harmonious whole. And there is precedent for such interpretation in Johnson v. United States
G,1Jpsum Co., (1950) Ark. 229 S.W. 2d 671, where the
Arkansas court held:
·'The words of the statute (in issue) were:
In cases of appeal to the Supreme Court, the
transcribed notes of the stenographer shall be
treated as a bill of exceptions or as depositions
in the case until the same is approved by the

11

Chancellor trying the case and
sue1i app ,
.
d urmg
.
must be given
the term 0 .. . ro.:i
time fixed for such approval bv tll r \\it11ll' tht
"
e court.'
"'Ve have italicized three words {' l
merely to show that there is an obviotia~ a 10 H ·
· 1 error in the wording
s on11ss1·
or t ypogra p h ica
, f ·, 'L
Act. The Legislature evidently meant ti.) di(
t ranscri'b ed no t es sha 11 not be ( mstead
.
f'iat· ·h·tLt
0
b '
·
-.e) trea te~ as a bill of exceptions or as de~all11
s1hons until approved by the Chancel! or. p11r
·
perh aps t h at t hey shall be so treated when ,
stead of 'until') approved by him. Wh-en a 11.'u,.
in a statute is omitted
or misused ' it is the r1u,·.
.
of t.he co_urt.s to disregard the error if the c:ontex;
plamly mdicates the legislative intent. .

°;

1

'

The interpretation given the statute by the Cit1.
attorney destroys the entire statutory scheme, while tbt:
trial court's construction saves and harmonizes all par~;
of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The City's right to hire does not necessarily carry
with it the right to discharge. The protection giYen
these employees is c1ear from 49-2-4 and 5. Job tenure
is an important factor, not only to the individual, but
also to insure stable and efficient government. Siner
1947, in the State, employees have been protected from
dismissal for their religious and political beliefs; since
1955 they have been shielded because of membership or
non-membership in unions; since 1965 the right has been
extended to include race, creed and color. It is just
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11 \{ 1 late 111 thl' l'ent11ry to buy Appellant's thesis that
t i'tployec .\ ppt>al Hoar< ls Yiolate constitutional rights
, t

l·ity gm erning bodies. A rule of law has replaeell

::rli1!rary t>mplo:·er unfair practices in employment in
,fu~tr;. :incl iu gm·ernment. Banishment from one's

,nd:· be sustainecl by showing
,rnccdurai fairness. where it concerns a
1
, rnployee who has acquirecl Yested job
1 ig·l1[~ \ \' c submit that the trial court's
111 !1 l':ItI

11c

just cause and
permanent city
and retirement
decision should

:11t'irmed.
Re::- pectfully submitted,

A. \Vally Sandack
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein
oOG

El Paso Natural Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent
Dated: .June 5, 1967
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APPENDIX

15

iJHlJI~,\~CES

OF SALT LAKE CITY, lTTAII
February, 1967

~~:c. :!.J-11-1. SCOPE OF CHAPTER. It is
LI'' purpose of this chapter to establish uniform rules
:i·id rt~·ttlat1011s gon·nung personnel administration in
.di dep~trtments of city government, provided, however,

:li:i~ t.l1c prm isi011s hereof shall not apply to elective

,. 1fiL 1;1

b. their administratice assistants, their personal
lie ads of departments, nor to civil service

·" cTd:I l'll'~.

;1t·rso1111cl of the poliee, fire and health dep<utments.
~r:l'. :!:5-11-2.

STATEMENT OF POLICY.

c1nphJycc covered by t~1!s chaJ?ter shall be discharged
trau'.'.i'tTre!l to a position with less remuneration
litciu-;l· (\f \Jis politics or religious belief, or incident
:, .. <1r through changes, either in the elective officers,
J-',11" 1 r11i11g hod y, or heads of departments.
\ t'

.1"

SEC. :!5-11-3. DISCHARGE OR TRANSFER In all cases where any employee is discharged
from om position to another for any reason, he shall
n:m: the right to appeal such discharge or transfer
in accordance with Section 49-2-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
SEC. 25-11-4. APPEAL BOARD. There is
hereby created an appeal board to consist of five members. three of whom shall be chosen by and from the
appointed officers and employees, and two of whom
~hall be city commissioners, said members to hold office
for a term of two years and to be chosen as follows:
(I\ The three appointive officer and employee
members shall be chosen by ballot, each appointive
otf icer or employee of the city being entitled to cast
one Yote for each member to be chosen. A general
meeting of the appointiYe officers and employees of the
city shall be held on the second Tuesday of January,
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of each even-numbered year at which m t'
officers and employees shall' elect three aee 1 ~g ~he said
cer an d emp loyee members to serve onpporntive
·a 0ff'1•
1
board. At least ten days prior to the ho1J~ appe1d
meeting, the city commissioners shall apprn~ tof said
. .
ff"
om soni
?-PPOm~1ve o icer ~r employ~e to act as secretar. e
n;ig notice thereof m a conspicuous place in eac~ ~f~st.
city departments continuously for at least ti d he
prior to the date of said meeting.
ve ays
The .three 3:Ppointive officers and employees shall
be each from different statutory depar~ments and no
~erso? from any department shall be eligible for election. if any. other person from t~1e same department
receives a higher number of votes m the balloting evei
though such person may receive more votes than~ per~
son ~rom a d1ff erent departme1:1t: Except for this qualification, the three persons rece1vmg the highest number
of votes at said meeting shall be declared chosen as the
appointive officer and employee members of said appeal
board. Bi-annually thereafter, the appointive officer
and employee members of said appeal board shall be
chosen in similar manner and at similar time.
( 2) On the second Tuesday of January of each
even-numbered year, two city commissioners shall be
appointed by the city commission as a whole.

( 3) In the event a vacancy occurs in the appointive
officer and employee membership of said appeal board, ,
the remaining appointive officer and employee member
or members may fill such vacancy by appoi?tment, the
appointee to hold offi~e until th.e 1:1-ext elect10n. ~n case
of a vacancy in the city comm1ss10n members~1p such
vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the city commission as a whole. A vacancy shall occur w~enever
any member resigns or dies ?r ref uses to act or his sm·
ices with the city are termmated.
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SEC. 25-11-5. EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES.
It shall be the policy of Salt Lake City. to adjust griev-

·inces of employees promptly and fairly. Within the
f'ramework of existing la\'Ys and regulations, every effort shall be made tu ad.Just grievances in a manner
lllutually satisfactory to. employees and management.
Aiw employee who believes that he has received incqt;itahle treatment because of some cond~tion of his
employment, may pe~sonally or through. l~1s representative, appeal for relief from that condition. In any
'•TieYnnce not inrnlving discharge or transfer the follow;~g proce<lure shall be followed:
An employee or his representative is expected to
[liscuss any grievance initially with his immediate superYisor. Then, if the matter is not settled, the grievance
mav be discussed with the division head or with the
he;d of the department. If the grievance arises out of
a matter over which the supervision, division head, or
department head has no control, the employee or his
representative in his behalf, may carry such grievance
to the board of commissioners. Supervisory personnel
at all levels are responsible for receiving and acting
upon employee complaints. In the presentation of grievances at any supervisory level, employees are insured
fre.edom from restraint, interference, discrimination or
reprisal.
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